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Can the publication of annual financial reports 
become an opportunity for insider trading?
1. Introduction
Financial markets struggle with the problem of market abuse behaviors, such 
as insider trading and market manipulation. Supervisory authorities that control 
the market should detect and consistently penalize all actions that are illegal in 
terms of local capital market law.
Under the name of market manipulation, we comprehend all actions that 
lead to security price changes or to a change of perception of market participants 
on security itself. The actions may be caused by the spread of misleading informa-
tion (information-based manipulation) or by making transactions (market-based 
manipulation). In each case, the aim of market manipulators is to draw attention 
to their operations and to trigger a desired reaction in others. For this reason, 
market manipulation has a greater chance of being detected than insider trading, 
which is hidden by insiders. Insider trading relies on making transactions based 
on privileged or inside information that is not available to other participants of 
the market. The research on profits from insider trading behavior can be treated 
as part of the study on the hypothesis of efficient market formulated by Fama 
(1970). In its strong form, the hypothesis postulates that even privileged informa-
tion is fully reflected in security prices, and that having knowledge of it cannot 
lead to superior profits. Penalties that are imposed by supervisory authorities for 
insider trading do not enforce the strong form of market efficiency. Researchers 
assume that insider trading leads to unusual security price changes observed 
ahead of an announcement, which has an impact on prices. Increased trading 
volume may be noted simultaneously. Meulbroek (1992) states that this can be 
caused by uninformed investors who follow insiders and empower the changes 
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in trading. The so-called herd-effect on the Polish stock market is studied by Gur-
gul and Majdosz (2007).
In the European Union, regulations related to market abuse were included 
in Directive 2003/6/EC. This document gives definitions and regulations that 
are homogeneous across all member states. Moreover, in April 2014, the Euro-
pean Council accepted applications recommended by European Commission 
that will unify the notion of market crime and penalties for it. In spite of a clear 
definition of prohibited actions and a severe system of punishment, the scale of 
market abuse will not be whittled down if its methods of detection are not ef-
ficient. As it is still not easy to detect and prove market abuse, more research on 
this problem required.
In the literature, several methods of detecting insider trading can be found. 
One of them is proposed by Monteiro et al. (2007). In 2001, the Financial Ser-
vices Authority (FSA) of the United Kingdom introduced the Financial Services 
and Markets Act (FSMA). The document simplifies procedures for prosecuting 
market abuse and gives the FSA a wider scope of activities in case of various 
types of abuse. Monteiro et al. (2007) try to answer the question if the introduc-
tion of the FSMA significantly minimizes the number of market crimes. They 
focus on insider trading that may take place as a result of two kinds of announce-
ments - public takeover announcements and trading statements of the issuer of 
FTSE350. Using event-study analysis and bootstrap methods, they have found 
statistically significant announcements that have had an impact on security pric-
es. Afterwards, in this restricted set of events, they look for the ones preceded 
by informed price movement. The assumption is that a significant change in the 
price of a security observed directly before the announcement can be a signal 
of insider trading. Additionally, apart from price analysis, they also search for 
abnormal volumes before the events. The results suggest that the scale of insider 
trading did not decrease after the FSMA introduction, but only after the FSA 
brought the first insider trading enforcement case under the new regime. The 
analysis of Monteiro et al. (2007) enables us to search for potential insider trad-
ing cases; however, it has one weakness – the research can be conducted only 
after the announcement that is suspect of market abuse, so it is unable to detect 
insider trading in real time.
The endeavor of creating a procedure that allows us to detect market abuse 
in real time was undertaken by Minenna (2003). He defines four diffusion pro-
cesses that describe the behaviors of elementary variables related to security: 
returns, trading volumes, statistic concentration of the market, and dynamic con-
centration of the market. The procedure operates on a daily basis; the param-
eters are updated each day. Minenna (2003) constructs a confidence interval for 
each of the variables, and using daily data collected over a relatively short period 
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of time, he makes predictions of the variables for the next day. On the day when 
the variables are outside the interval, he signals the alert. He assumes that a trad-
ing day is anomalous when there is an alert on at least three of four tripwires. In 
his research, Minnena (2003) appeals repeatedly to the supervisory experience 
of the Consob – the government authority of Italy responsible for regulating the 
Italian securities market. Quoting Consob’s studies, his main assumption is that 
volumes as well as returns and concentration measures can be well-described 
in discrete time by an autoregressive process AR(1) whose continuous-time ver-
sion is an Orstein-Uhlenbeck diffusion process. The validity of this fundamental 
assumption is open to doubt, as it is known that e.g., a time series of returns 
may be characterized by serial correlation as well as heretoskedasticity. The veri-
fication of goodness of the fit should be executed before the application of the 
procedure. As the information necessary to construct market concentration mea-
sures is not public, the method proposed by Minenna (2003) can be held only by 
the authorities who have access to it.
Market abuse detection on the Polish equity market is researched inter alia 
by Cholewiński (2009), who proposes a model founded on real-time analysis. 
He draws on the prediction intervals used by Minena (2003) and on the market 
model proposed by Monteiro et al.(2007). Additionally, he introduces time-vary-
ing parameters to the expected returns equation and estimates them using a Kal-
man filter. Another method of detecting insider trading has been proposed by 
Park and Lee (2010). Using high-frequency data, they demonstrate that, when an 
insider transaction occurs, a time series of intraday returns follow the ARMA(1,1) 
process. They define tree criteria for detecting insider trading under this assump-
tion and validate them by constructing appropriate tests. Olmo et al. (2011) con-
structed consistent timing structural break tests to detect insider trading behav-
ior. Adopting an extended capital asset pricing model to a security return time 
series, they claim that this type of market abuse leads to structural change in the 
intercept of the model.
In this paper, I discuss market abuse behavior on the Polish equity market. 
I investigate whether or not publications of annual financial reports of issuers 
may cause opportunities for insider trading. On the basis of daily returns of secu-
rities incorporated in WIG index, I search for informed price movements before 
the date of disclosure of annual financial results of a company. The data was 
collected from January 2010 until May 2014. Each announcement that might be 
suspect of insider trading is additionally analyzed for the presence of abnormal 
trading volumes.
The structure of the paper is as follows: data and methodology applied in 
the study are described in Section 2. Empirical results of the analysis are dis-
cussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
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2. Data and methodology
In this article, I devote my attention to annual financial reports published by 
issuers of companies listed in the WIG index. Publications of companies’ results 
are seen as significant to the market, which should be reflected in price changes. 
Price movements observed ahead of the publication could indicate potential in-
sider trading. Annual reports were selected for the research, although their impact 
on prices may be not as significant as that of the reports published more frequent-
ly (and therefore containing information more difficult to predict). The choice 
was dictated by the methodology applied in the study. The GARCH process that 
was used requires at least one hundred daily returns to be well suited, while esti-
mation windows consisting of these returns in event study analysis should be dis-
jointed. Quarterly or even semi-annual reports do not meet these requirements.
In my research, I gathered information on the publication dates of annual 
reports from the period between 1 January, 2010, and 29 May, 2014, which are 
available on www.gpwinfostrefa.pl. Because most of the reports appear in the 
first half of the year (mostly in March and April), I took into account companies 
listed in the WIG index at the beginning of the year and after the first adjustment 
of the index in a given year. Due to the facts that not all of the dates were available 
and that, in some cases, the data did not meet the assumptions of the model, the 
initial number of the companies’ announcements decreased. 
The number of announcements researched each year is presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Number of annual financial reports of WIG issuers studied in the research







In order to investigate the occurrence of informed price movements, event 
study methodology is used. Formalized by Fama et al. (1969), it is still a prevailing 
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method applied to assess the reaction of standard market variables to unantici-
pated events. For each announcement, pre-event and event windows are defined. 
If we denote the day of the announcement by t = 0, then the pre-event window 
(lasting 200 days and ending eight days before the announcement) is t = –208, … , 
t = –8. The pre-event window is as long as possible to avoid a situation where it 
includes the period around the announcement published the previous year and 
the days directly before the announcement (when prices could be influenced by an 
expected release). The event window covers four days, from t = –2 to t = 1.
For each day in both the pre-event window and the event window, I calculate 
abnormal returns, which are the differences between actual returns and expected 
returns defined by the model:
   i t i t i tAR R E R 
where i tR  is the logarithmic rate of return of i-th company on day t.
The expected returns are calculated in four different ways, as proposed by 
Monteiro et al. (2007). The starting model is the classic market model, namely:
 i t m tR R DE  H
where m tR  is the market return on day t, represented by the WIG return, and H 
is the error on a given day. I assume that errors are independent and identically 
distributed with an expected value of zero and constant variance. The validity of 
these assumptions is tested using the Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation and 
Engle’s Arch Test of heteroscedasticity. When estimation errors are correlated, 
lagged variables are added to the model:
   1 2 1 3 1i t m t i t m tR R R R  DE E E  H
In the case of heteroscedasticity, the assumption that the variance of the er-
ror is not constant is added to the first or second model, respectively. It follows 
the GARCH(1,1) equation:
    2 1 1t t tVar a b c Var H   H  H
Initially, abnormal returns were calculated under the assumption that they 
were normally distributed, but this hypothesis was rejected in about 90% of the 
considered time series. The model with t-student distribution of errors turned 
out to be well-specified. After calculating, abnormal returns were standardized so 
that they could be comparable. Significant announcements and preceding price 
movements were found in two ways. 
The first part of the research is based on the method proposed by Monteiro 
et al. (2007) with some modifications. 
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Monteiro et al. (2007) calculate four-day cumulative abnormal returns 
 2 1CAR  , where:
   2
1




CAR t t  ¦
and compare them with 50,000 four-day abnormal returns drawn randomly from 
the estimation window. They assume that the event is significant at the 5% level, 
if the corresponding CAR(–2,1) is in the group of 2,500 most-negative simulated 
four-day CARs or in the group of 2,500 most-positive simulated four-day CARs.
In this research, I look for significant announcements using two-day CAR(0,1) 
instead of four-day CAR(–2,1). When a report brings an important piece of informa-
tion to the market, the price of the security should change on the day of the event 
(or on the day after the release at the latest). The change in a price at the same 
direction one or two days before the publication of a report could be seen as in-
formed price movement and would empower the significance of CAR(–2,1). None-
theless, a report that is seen as positive news can be preceded by a negative event, 
not necessarily connected with the report. If this event causes a sharp slide in the 
price, four-day CAR(–2,1) could not differ significantly from zero or could even 
be significantly negative despite positive information in the report. Using two-day 
CAR(0,1) instead of four-day CAR(–2,1) prevents the publication of a report in the 
above situation from being defined as an irrelevant or significantly negative event. 
I draw two-day cumulative abnormal returns 50,000 times randomly from 
the estimation window and define significant announcements in the same way as 
Monteiro et al. (2007) do using two-day CARs instead of four-day CARs. For each 
significant announcement, I calculate two-day CAR(–2,–1)* and repeat the boot-
strap procedure used before. I compare CAR(–2,–1) with the previously-obtained 
set of 50,000 two-day CARs. I assume that the actual two-day CAR(–2,–1) is signifi-
cant at a 5% level and presume that there is potential informed price movement 
before the announcement if the CAR(–2,–1) is within the 2,500 most-negative 
simulated two-day CAR and corresponding CAR(0,1) was significantly negative, 
or in the situation where it is within the 2,500 most-positive simulated two-day 
CAR and the corresponding CAR(0,1) was significantly positive.
Since the first procedure gives very few cases of potential informed price 
movements, I decided to expand the analysis to daily abnormal returns from 
seven days before an announcement. The event window is broadened and con-
tains nine days, from t = –7 to t = 1 The model of abnormal returns is the same 
as in the first part of the research. Estimated errors are described by t-student 
distribution. When abnormal returns on day t = 0 and t =1 are both higher (or 
lower) than an appropriate quantile of t-student distribution, or when only one 
of them is significantly different from zero, the event is defined as a significant 
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one. For a significant event, price movements observed over the period of seven 
days before a publication are found in the same way. There is a suspicion of in-
formed price movement if a change in a price on the day of the event and on one 
of the preceding days have the same direction. 
After the analysis of abnormal returns, I verify if potential informed price 
movements are accompanied by an increase in trading volume. Following Cready 
and Ramanan (1991), I use logarithmic transformation of raw volumes:
  OQ 1i t i tv volume 
In the estimation window, a trend line is determined based on trading vol-
umes. Abnormal trading volumes are defined as the differences between the ac-
tual trading volumes and the levels of the volumes coming from a trend line. 
If there is no trend, they are calculated as the differences between the actual trad-
ing volumes and the mean of the trading volumes from the estimation window. 
I replace a zero trading volume with the mean trading volume from the estima-
tion window. To abnormal volumes, I fit normal distribution or t-student distri-
bution when the residuals are not normally distributed. Significantly-increased 
trading volumes are defined likewise in the case of returns.
3. Empirical results
3.1. General findings of the analysis of cumulative abnormal returns
General findings of the research conducted with the use of two-day cumula-
tive abnormal returns are presented in Table 2. From the set of announcements 
used in the research in a given year, the number of significant news is detailed. 
The events that influence security prices constitute quite a low percentage of all 
of the announcements (from 9% in 2012 to 20% in 2013). This can be explained 
by the fact that the disclosure date of an annual financial report is set at the begin-
ning of a year and is made public to all members of the market. What is more, the 
official version of a report is sometimes preceded by a publication of preliminary 
results. For this reason, the final statement may not be an unexpected event caus-
ing a strong reaction of the market.
From the group of significant announcements, I detailed potential informed 
price movements (IPMs), which are the events that reveal price changes one or 
two days before a report publication. These events are suspected to be marked by 
insider trading. The measure of IPMs is constructed as the quotient of the num-
ber of IPMs and significant announcements. The highest measure is obtained 
in 2014, where five out of the 23 significant announcements are preceded by 
a significant change in security price. From 2010 to 2013, there were only two 
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IPMs per year. The results do not indicate any trend. The significant news per-
sists at a low level, with the exception of 2013, when its amount more or less 
doubled, but remained not high. Only a few out of the significant pieces of news 
constitute informed price movements. Cumulatively, about 12% of all announce-
ments taken on board cause price movements, and in 10% of them, the change 
in a price appears before the publication of the news.
Table 2










2010 206 20 (10%) 2 10
2011 220 21 (10%) 2 10
2012 252 23 (9%) 2 9
2013 222 44 (20%) 2 5
2014 225 23 (10%) 5 22
SUM 1125 131 (12%) 13 10
In order to elaborate the results, I divide the significant announcements into 
two groups: reports that raise the price of security and reports that lower the price. 
The results are presented in Table 3. In the former group, I single out the reports 
that are preceded by an increase in price (column “IPMs plus”), while in the latter, 
I search for a decrease in price before the announcement (column “IPMs minus”).
Table 3
The measure of potential informed price movements, obtained from the analysis of 




Significant IPMs Measure [%]
plus minus plus minus plus minus
2010 206 12 8 2 0 17 0
2011 220 14 7 1 1 7 14
2012 252 11 12 1 1 9 8
2013 222 18 26 1 1 6 4
2014 225 9 14 3 2 33 14
SUM 1125 64 67 8 5 13 7
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There is no considerable difference between the numbers of two kinds of 
announcements. A slight dominance of the reports that yield drops in prices can 
be noticed, but in the group of the positive events, the percentage of announce-
ments preceded by price movement is higher.
3.2. Results from the analysis of daily abnormal returns
Since the analysis of cumulative abnormal returns detects quite a small 
group of desired price changes, I expand my research. One of the punished cases 
of insider trading in Poland took place in 2008. One week before publication of 
a quarterly financial report, a share price of a company plummeted. It turned 
out that sellers received privileged information about a company’s worse-than-
expected financial performance. This example suggests that not only the period 
of two days before a financial report publication should be traced for insider trad-
ing. Taking this into account, I extend the event window so that it begins seven 
trading days before a report publication and explore daily abnormal returns in-
stead of cumulative ones. The results from the analysis, detailing drops and falls 
in security prices, are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
The measure of potential informed price movements for positive and negative events. 




Significant IPMs Measure [%]
plus minus plus minus plus minus
2010 206 19 16 2 8 11 50
2011 220 22 16 6 8 27 50
2012 252 18 17 4 6 22 35
2013 222 27 34 7 10 26 29
2014 225 24 34 7 12 29 35
SUM 1125 110 117 26 44 24 38
227 70 31
It is visible that considering daily abnormal returns instead of cumulative 
ones doubled the number of significant events, which is now about 20% of all 
announcements. The number of price movements ahead of the event increased 
greatly. The group of the announcements that cause price falls is slightly larger 
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than the one which causes price rises. Interestingly, there are more price falls 
before negative events than price rises before positive ones each year. In the last 
two years, the number of significant (especially negative) events is noticeably 
higher than in the previous years. As a result, there are more potential informed 
price movements. The measure of IMPs in the group of positive events remains 
at a level of slightly more than 20% (with the exception of the year 2011, when 
this measure is markedly lower). In the group of negative events, the measure is 
higher – from 29% in 2013 to 50% in 2010 and 2011.
The results obtained from the first and second methods were compared. 
Each price movement ahead of the publication of the report discovered in the 
analysis of cumulative abnormal return was also detected in the research of daily 
abnormal returns. The second method, as it was more detailed, was able to reveal 
more potential informed price movements.
As it was pointed out at the beginning of the article, price movement observed 
directly before significant news can be a signal of insider trading. This is, however, 
not the only possible explanation for price changes. These can also be caused by 
investors who speculate on the results of a company and who count a company’s 
preliminary statements in their expectations. The cause of the movement can be 
many other different important publications that appear on the market as well. 
Retrospectively, it is almost impossible to detect and properly define all po-
tential reasons for changes in markings from the previous few years. It is likely 
that not all detected price movements are caused by insider trading. However, 
the analysis conducted here can be perceived as an attempt to estimate the scale 
of insider trading that precedes financial reports published by companies. 
3.3. The analysis of abnormal trading volumes
The cases of price movements observed directly before the releases of annual 
financial statements were additionally checked for the presence of significantly-
high trading volumes. As it was pointed out earlier, higher-than-expected trading 
volumes can be caused by uninformed investors who follow insider behavior. 
Simultaneous price and volume change is a signal that important information 
was delivered to the market. The results of the analysis of trading volumes are 
presented in Table 5.
From 70 cases of potential informed price movements, only 15 (21%) are 
marked with high trading volumes observed the same day. In this group, mark-
ings of each company are retraced in the search for the reasons for price and 
volume changes.
 In 2010, the two companies that noted increases in prices and trading vol-
umes ahead of the publication of annual financial reports publicized information 
Milena Suliga
87
Can the publication of annual financial reports become an opportunity for insider trading? 
about signing letters of intent with potential US investors on the same day. In all 
probability, this was the real reason for positive changes in their markings. Inter-
estingly, these companies revealed this information with a two-day delay, which 
was punished by the KNF – the Polish financial supervisory authority. A detailed 
analysis showed that, before revealing the information, one of the companies not-
ed an increase in price while the latter noted an increase in volumes. These results 
suggest that the delay could be intentional and related to illegal insider trading. 
Table 5
Number of publications that are marked with potential informed price movements as 
well as increased trading volumes. Results from the analysis of daily abnormal returns 
and volumes
Year
IPMs High trading volume
plus minus plus minus
2010 2 8 2 4
2011 6 8 1 1
2012 4 6 0 1
2013 7 10 1 1
2014 7 12 1 3
SUM 26 44 7 8
 In 2014, the company with a positive price movement two days ahead of 
a reveal of annual report published information on the payments of dividends. 
The note about the forefront position in the group of companies listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange was enclosed. That day, price and trading volumes rose. 
Another company, marked with a price decline, published the information on 
establishing a lien on the assets of a significant value.
Do the remaining cases bear association with insider trading? A detailed 
analysis of available news releases from the period under study does not bring 
any excuses for observed abnormal returns and volumes. Meulbroek (1992) as 
well as Cornell and Sirri (1992) show that such unexplained alerts appear on 
days marked by insider trading. Although they cannot pose any kind of statistical 
proof of market abuse behavior, they give an important signal for the financial 
supervisory authority that should closely monitors markings of the companies. 
The analysis of penalties imposed by the KNF shows that none of the com-
panies marked with potential IPMs was punished for insider trading. If we look 
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a few years back, it is really difficult to ascertain whether the frauds did not take 
place or if they remained undetected.
 However, he method proposed here for detecting price and volume move-
ment does not require such a time delay. It can be carried out directly after the 
release of a significant report to check if the report was preceded by informed 
price and volume movement. If the market is observed on line, it is feasible to 
notice inexplicable changes in markings that could be a signal of insider trading.
4. Conclusions
This paper analyses the detection of insider trading related to publications of 
financial reports made by companies. The occurrence of potential informed price 
movements ahead of such publications is checked with event study methodology. 
The research embraces annual financial reports of companies listed in the WIG 
index from January 2010 until May 2014. The analysis of cumulative and after-
ward daily abnormal returns reveals that most of the annual financial reports are 
not price-sensitive events. Only about 20% of them are marked with significant 
changes in prices. In this group, slightly more than 30% are preceded by poten-
tial informed price movement. The market seems to be more sensitive to negative 
information, and in this group of events, the number of price changes ahead of 
the report publication is greater. Every fifth case of premature price movement is 
accompanied by significantly-high abnormal trading volume – the signal confirm-
ing that important information was delivered to the market.
In most cases, simultaneous changes in price and volume preceding the re-
lease of annual financial reports are inexplicable. Although the noted abnormal 
prices and volumes cannot be treated as proof of insider trading, they give us 
a general overview of the potential scale of this phenomenon and suggest a posi-
tive answer to the question included in the title of the article. The results of the 
research alert that the publication of an annual financial report can become an 
opportunity for insider trading. However, to determine whether illegal trading 
preceded a particular announcement, further analysis should be conducted by an 
appropriate oversight agency.
The method applied in the research seems to be effective in anomalous trad-
ing detection; hence, it can be employed as a first step in detecting insider trad-
ing. The weakness of the method is that potential market abuse cannot be found 
in real time. However, if markings of a company as well as price-sensitive infor-
mation coming on the market are monitored on line, the detection of the signals 
of insider trading has only a short delay.
Milena Suliga
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